Aranow & Einhorn on proxy contests for corporate control.
Read Online
Share

Aranow & Einhorn on proxy contests for corporate control. by Randall S. Thomas

  • 955 Want to read
  • ยท
  • 75 Currently reading

Published by Aspen Law & Business in New York .
Written in English

Subjects:

Places:

  • United States.

Subjects:

  • Proxy -- United States.

Book details:

Edition Notes

Other titlesProxy contests for corporate control, Aranow and Einhorn on proxy contests for corporate control
ContributionsDixon, Catherine T., 1955-, Aranow, Edward Ross.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsKF1451 .A932
The Physical Object
Pagination1 v. (loose-leaf) ;
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL694203M
ISBN 101567066011
LC Control Number97041498
OCLC/WorldCa37705324

Download Aranow & Einhorn on proxy contests for corporate control.

PDF EPUB FB2 MOBI RTF

Rev. ed. of: Proxy contests for corporate control / by Edward Ross Aranow & Herbert A. Einhorn. 2nd ed. Includes index. Description: 1 v. (loose-leaf) ; 26 cm. Other Titles: Proxy contests for corporate control Aranow and Einhorn on proxy contests for corporate control. Book Reviews ARANOW, EDWARD Ross and EINHORN, HERBERT A. Proxy Contests for Corporate Control. New York, N.Y. Columbia University Press. pp. $ The dichotomy between the technical, legal ownership of a great, modem cor-poration by its shareholders and the effective control of the corporation by its. Aranow, Edward Ross. Proxy contests for corporate control. New York: Columbia University Press, (OCoLC) Document Type: Book: All Authors / Contributors: Edward Ross Aranow; Herbert A Einhorn. securities, and require proxy-statement-type disclosure in connection with a change of a majority of the directors following a takeover.9 Aranow and Einhorn, practitioners with broad experience in tender offers and proxy fights and authors of Proxy Contests for Corporate Control,'0 have written a treatise that covers substantially.

the basic source-book for lawyers, businessmen, the financial com-munity, specialists, consultants, and others involved in corporate takeovers. It would appear that the Aranow-Einhorn team thrives on challenges, for they have done it again with their recently pub-lished Developments in Tender Offers for Corporate : J. William Robinson. CORPORATE PROXY CONTESTS: EXPENSES OF MANAGEMENT AND INSURGENTS* Edward Ross Aranow and Herbert A. Einhornt I One of the most important advantages available to management in a proxy contest is its ready access to the corporate treasury to defray many of the expenses of waging the contest. These expenses have tended toCited by: 1. * This article is based on chapters of a book by the authors to be published later this year by the Columbia University Press, under the title Corporate Meetings, Proxy Contests and Legal Remedies. Irving Novick and Lloyd I. Singer assisted in its preparation. t Members of the firm of Aranow, Brodsky, Bohlinger, Einhorn & Dann, New York : Edward Ross, Herbert A. EmIlHORNx. Proxy Contests for Corporate Control-Aranow & Einhorn The Delaware Law of Corporations & Business Organizations (3rd)-Balotti Meetings of Stockholders-Balotti Delaware Corporation Law and Practice-Matthew Bender The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors-Block Corporate Governance-Branson.

She is co-author of a treatise on the federal proxy rules, Aranow and Einhorn on Proxy Contests for Corporate Control (3d ed., with Randall Thomas). Ms. Dixon also has taught a course on mergers & acquisitions at Georgetown University Law Center as an adjunct faculty member. OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 65 n. 3 () [hereinafter cited as ARANow & EINHORN]. Some of the reasons suggested for the increased use of the tender offer device are: (1) increased corporate liquidity and readily available credit; (2) comparatively de-pressed price/earnings ratios, book values, and cash or quick assets ratios, making. Randall S. Thomas, with Catherine Dixon. Aranow & Einhorn on Proxy Contests for Corporate Control, 3rd ed. New York: Aspen Law & Business, Review of Aranow & Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control, 71 Harv. L. Rev. (). Statement, in 3 General Revenue Revision (Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing, Jan. 31, ). Subchapter S and its Effect on the Capitalization of Corporations, 13 Vand. L. Rev. ().Author: Kent Olson.